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Absract. We look at modern markets and discuss their current treatment by policy 
makers, analyzing policy recommendations regarding the treatment of such markets 
in the future. These include recommendations regarding the taxation treatment of 
informal markets; the presence of market power and anti-competitive strategies in 
health markets and platform two-sided markets; investment and arbitrage functions 
in foreign exchange markets; regulation and competition in the Canadian banking 
sector; asymmetric regulation in mobile termination charges and technological 
diffusion; incentive regulation in telecoms and its impact on productive efficiency; 
welfare enhancing government intervention recommendations in broadcasting. 
Finally, we give an overview of the overall success of the UK Competition 
Commission as a second stage enforcer of regulatory policy and competition law. 
 
JEL classification: D4, G2, I11, L1, L96, O3. 
Keywords: Structure of modern markets, Regulation, Policy, Telecommunications 
 
1. Introduction to the Symposium 
The tension between the assignation of property rights (mainly of the intellectual 
variety), the regulation of such rights, and antitrust policy in modern markets is 
highlighted in Vickers (2009). While it is argued that the assignation of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) is justified, (despite the non-rivalrous nature of these type of 
goods and services), because it is essential to provide a profit incentive for 
innovations to occur (dynamic efficiency arguments), this is by no means generally 
accepted as Segal and Whinston (2007) argue. 
Dynamic rivalry and the need for a sequence of innovations to occur implies 
that, in some circumstances, if things are to move forward, innovation must be 
licensed to rivals because it constitutes an essential facility without which 
competition cannot develop. Negative effects on rivals will eventually lead to the 
detriment of the consumers who are deprived of the emergence of a truly competitive 
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dynamic market. This is particularly true in markets with a fast technological pace 
and/or network/platform access characteristics, as IPRs may assist in entrenching a 
dominant position.  
Therefore it seems that the incentive to innovate is greater when access is 
granted more freely. If the profits from new inventions are lower because the market 
leaders are forced to licence their know-how on easy terms, this will be compensated 
by the fact that smaller firms will be able to catch up more quickly as diffusion 
increases and hence competition will become more aggressive. 
Moreover antitrust principles should be applied more stringently when a 
dominant firm uses its property rights to stifle “follow-on”' innovations, as happened 
in the case of Microsoft. The company tried to push Netscape out of the market as it 
believed that the latter would use the success of its browser as a platform to compete 
against Microsoft's Windows. 
We take the view that analysis of real economic problems requires skills 
derived from a variety of experiences. As a consequence, the papers in this issue of 
the journal include submissions from both academics and practitioners in the field of 
competition, regulation and macroeconomic policy enforcement. This covers both 
theoretical and technical papers addressing issues in regulation, competition policy, 
and competition law in many different markets. The papers are briefly discussed 
below in the same alphabetical order as they appear in the issue. 
 
2. An Overview of the Symposium 
The Arbex and Villamil paper examines the structure of a modern market from the 
side of the informal economy. In an economy where agents can evade taxes and it is 
costly to enforce the tax code, a positive interest rate and inflation can be used as a 
second best to tax. The authors show that irrespective of whether there is tax evasion 
(e.g., informal economy) or not, the Friedman rule is not the optimal monetary 
policy. The alternative of the imposition of a positive interest rate is optimal. 
While such problems can be alleviated by the presence of high tax-evasion 
penalties (as these imply deterring evasion at minimal costs and restoring the validity 
of the Friedman rule), the government policy recipe of severely punishing tax 
evasion is electorally unappetizing. Social norms are against “cruel and unusual” 
punishments. However, the paper argues that the conclusion that the government is 
effectively forced to pursue the more acceptable alternative of higher interest rates 
instead can also be avoided. By considering the possibility of tax enforcement 
whereby the informal sector is also taxed, a more original avenue appears where the 
government collects taxes from the informal sector and sets those taxes high to 
compensate for the tax enforcement costs. 
Taxation, this time in combination with regulation in the banking sector, 
makes a second appearance in the Brox paper on Canadian banks. The paper 
discusses the economic resilience of these banks following the North American 
financial crisis. The combination of stringent capital requirements, low risk 
tolerance, and a conservative approach in both residential mortgages and balance 
Vol. 6 No. 2     Dassiou and Glycopantis:    Symposium on Modern Markets   3 
sheet structures has meant that none of the Canadian banks needed a bailout as a 
result of the recent economic crisis. This is despite the existence of NAFTA which 
has increased financial integration with the U.S. economy. In order to analyse the 
impact of the current financial crisis, Brox applies a financial flow model. 
The database employed is over the entire period from 1961-2008, covering a 
number of changes in loosening the financial regulation rules governing Canadian 
banks, especially in residential mortgage lending, foreign activities and competition, 
and phasing out reserve requirements. Despite the deregulation changes, the ratio of 
total liabilities held in the form of equity has remained stable at 7.5 percent. 
More recently, the proportion of long-term assets, mortgages and foreign 
assets has increased and this has happened at the expense of conventional lending by 
Canadian banks. However, unlike American mortgages, Canadian mortgages are 
relatively secure mortgages; they are not tax deductible, their loan-to-value ratios 
tend to be lower than in the United States, while only  5 percent of them are 
nonprime and only 25 percent securitised. 
The article by Dassiou, Glycopantis, and Stavropoulou provides an overview 
of the different forms of transactions that constitute bundling, explaining that it can 
emanate from the selling side, the buying side, or from both sides in the form of 
countertrade. They then proceed to use a linear programming model in the case of 
health-care provision to analyse how prices, i.e., weights, for the different items in a 
bundle of medical resources are formed, and the possible tension between a hospital 
and an insurance company. In the third part, the article looks at the specific case of 
the practice of bundling by Medicare, the social insurance system for health care in 
the United States. It considers its advantages, disadvantages, and various 
recommendations. 
We next move to an article that looks at foreign-exchange markets and 
specifically at the dynamic behaviour of the American dollar/British pound exchange 
rate during the 1971-2008 period. The Galvao, Montes-Rojas, and Olmo paper 
examines the existence of predictability in the evolution of exchange rates as this is 
essential for the existence of investment opportunities. 
The ability to forecast movements in the exchange rate implies that there are 
arbitrage opportunities which allow international investors to exploit them by 
carrying trade strategies. The paper finds that, at unusually high and low exchange 
values, the predictability of the exchange rate and hence the ability to forecast its 
value and exploit arbitrage opportunities is limited. On the other hand, for values 
with a high probability of occurring, the market is predictable and hence supports the 
profitability of investment strategies. 
The symposium contains three telecoms and media-related papers. The first 
of these papers by Lüftl and Cardona looks at the heavily contentious issue of mobile 
termination charges within a static versus dynamic efficiency framework, where the 
latter objective provides a justification for asymmetric regulation of termination 
charges as suggested by various authors (Gruber, 2000; Peitz, 2005; and Valletti, 
2006). It eases entry, encourages competition, and through the increase in price 
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competition, leads to widespread adoption of new technology diffusion. 
The authors look at three European countries (the UK, Austria, and Germany) 
and Australia and reflect on their experiences of introducing regulation on mobile 
termination charges and its resulting effects on diffusion. Austria and UK, both of 
which started with dynamic regulation and then later turned to a more static oriented 
(symmetric) price regulation, experienced a much faster penetration of 2G mobile 
services than Germany or Austria. However, the experience of Australia suggests 
that the establishment of a link between dynamic regulation and diffusion requires 
further research. 
Federica Maiorano looks at the estimation of technical efficiency by U.S. 
telecommunication operators using a distance function approach. This is applied to 
evidence from 27 such operators over the period 1990-2003, a period characterized 
by major changes in the industry. These include a surge in investment, as well as a 
move from rate-of-return regulation to price-cap regulation from 1990. The 
econometric specification employed by Maiorano allows inefficiency to vary over 
time. The results suggest that panel studies that constrain such variation (time 
invariant inefficiency) may underestimate the gain in technical efficiency resulting 
from the introduction of incentive regulation. 
The last paper in telecoms and media is by Hui Pan. He investigates the 
advertising intensity and channel content in a mixed duopoly paper where a state 
channel co-exists with a private one. While the private channel simply maximises 
profit on content and advertising revenue, the state channel maximizes viewers’ 
welfare with a break-even constraint. Obviously the private channel is worse off as a 
result of facing a state competitor. But such a market is socially preferable to a 
private duopoly as the latter is relatively less efficient than the former. While in a 
private channel duopoly market there is overdifferentiation, in the mixed duopoly 
market there is underdifferentiation. The interesting policy-related point made here is 
that the government, if it wishes to intervene, cannot reach a social optimum by 
using only a state channel. However, the paper does provide support for the existence 
of a public-sector broadcaster if the counterfactual is a private-channel duopoly 
market. 
Rufus Pollock examines another increasingly prevalent form of modern 
market structure, that of two-sided platform markets, and evaluates the control of 
porting costs, porting being the conversion of software or services developed for one 
platform to run on another. Porting essentially constitutes technological tying, which 
in this paper focuses on tying on the seller's rather than on the buyer's side. Such 
porting is not necessarily profit-enhancing; it may even lead to a reduction in profits 
by reducing platform competition. 
Behind an increase in porting costs lies the strategic motive of preserving an 
upstream monopoly by restricting downstream competition. Hence the activity of 
higher prices, combined with higher porting costs, can magnify consumer welfare 
losses accruing from monopoly up to nine times relative to that accruing from higher 
prices alone. The important antitrust policy implication of this finding is that in a 
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two-sided environment anti-competitive behaviour may manifest itself indirectly 
though actions taken to control porting, rather than directly through price-abusive 
behaviour or direct (buyer-side) tying. 
The last paper is a review from a legal perspective by Suzanne Rab on the 
role of the UK Competition Commission (CC) at the interface between sectoral 
regulation and competition law in modern markets. CC has a regulatory inquiry role 
as well as a market investigation reference and merger control role. In all three roles 
the CC is a second-stage authority. Since the Competition Act in 1998, the UK has 
operated concurrent competition law and sector regulation to deal with interface 
issues. Similarly, since the Enterprise Act in 2002 the CC’s role is determinative in 
market investigations and mergers. 
The paper looks at examples of all three types and then discusses the 
implications that stems from the experience in these examples. It seems that the CC 
enhances transparency when it carries a pure regulatory action as well as it makes 
regulation more facts-based and dynamic as both deregulatory as well as regulatory 
decisions can be taken; the CC may even ask for an overhaul of existing regulation. 
It also assists in establishing the need for infrastructure investment and makes 
explicit natural monopolies trade-offs. It may even tailor regulation to the national 
market by imposing behavioural remedies where necessary. Also, CC can play an 
indirect role by first-instance sector regulators accepting undertakings from parties in 
return for which the latter will avoid the need for a CC reference. 
 
3. Conclusions 
We believe that the above articles consider a number of issues unfolding the working 
of markets and suggest the way forward in terms of policy recommendations and 
treatment of the research and evaluation covering such markets. 
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